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Summary. - The theory of rural organization based on rational peasants in environments where 
information is imperfect and costly provides a simple explanation for a wide variety of 
phenomena in LDCs. it provides insights into both why sharecropping is so widespread and why 
it takes on the particular forms that it does; it provides an explanation of the interlinkage of credit 
and land markets, and of cost sharing. The paper argues that this theory provides a better 
explanation of these phenomena than do the competing theories. This theory can be viewed as an 
important application of a more general paradigm, the “Imperfect Information Paradigm,” which 
has been useful in explaining economic phenonema under a wide variety of settings: under 
competition, oligopoly, and monopoly; in labor markets, capital markets, in insurance markets. 
and product markets: and in developed and less developed countries. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For the past 15 years, I have been attempting 
to construct a consistent view of less developed 
economies and the development process, to 
identify in what ways they are similar and in what 
ways (and why) they are different from more 
developed economies.’ I cannot present even a 
summary of these views here. What I have been 
asked to do is to present one piece of that 
perspective, that relating to the organization of 
the rural sector, and to explain why I (or 
someone else) should “believe” these theories, or 
at least, why they are more plausible than several 
widely discussed alternative theories. 
There are five central tenets of my approach: 
1. Individuals (including peasants in the rural 
sectors of LDCs) are rational, that is, they act in 
a (reasonably) consistent manner, one which 
adapts to changes in circumstances. 
2. Information is costly. This has numerous 
important implications: individuals do not ac- 
quire perfect information, and hence their be- 
havior may differ markedly from what it would 
have been if they had perfect information. When 
individuals engage in a trade (buying labor 
services, extending credit, renting land or bul- 
locks), there is imperfect information concerning 
the items to be traded; thus, transactions which 
would be desirable in the presence of perfect 
information may not occur. Similarly, certain 
contracts, e.g. performing certain services at a 
certain standard, may not be feasible, especially 
if it is costly to ascertain, ex post. whether or how 
well those services have been performed. 
3. Institutions adapt to reflect these informa- 
tion (and other transaction) costs. Thus, institu- 
tions are not to be taken as exogenous, but are 
endogenous, and changes in the environment 
may lead, with a lag, to changes in institutional 
structure. 
4. The fact that individuals are rational and 
that institutions are adaptable does not, how- 
ever, imply that the economy is (Pareto) effi- 
cient. The efficiency of market economies 
obtains only under the peculiar set of circum- 
stances explored by Arrow and Debreu. These 
include a complete set of markets and perfect 
information, assumptions which, if questionable 
in more developed economies, are clearly irrelev- 
ant in LDCs. With imperfect information and 
incomplete markets, the economy is almost 
always constrained Pareto inefficient, i.e.. there 
exists a set of taxes and subsidies which can make 
everyone better off (See Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
forthcoming). 
5. This implies that there is a poferztiul role for 
the government. That is. the government could 
effect a Pareto improvement if(i) it had sufficient 
knowledge of the structure of the economy; (ii) 
those responsible for implementing government 
policy had at least as much information as those 
in the private sector; (iii) those responsible for 
designing and implementing government policy 
had the incentives to direct policies to effect 
Pareto improvements, rather than, for instance, 
to redistribute income (either from the poor to 
the rich or vice versa, or from everyone else, to 
*I am indebted to A. Braverman and R. Sah for helpful 
discussions. Financial support from the National 
Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
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themselves), often at considerable loss to 
national output. Informational problems, includ- 
ing incentive problems, are no less important in 
the public sector than in the private; the fact that 
we have studied them well in the latter does not 
mean that they are not present in the former. The 
consequence of these remarks is to make us 
cautious in recommending particular government 
actions as remedies for certain observed deficien- 
cies in the market. 
2. THE BASIC OUTLINES OF THE 
THEORY OF RURAL ORGANIZATION 
In this section, I wish to outline what the 
general approach presented above says about the 
economic organization of the rural sector. There 
are a wide variety of institutional arrangements 
observed in different LDCs. One set that has 
been of longstanding interest to economists is 
sharecropping. Earlier views of sharecropping 
held that it was an inefficient form of economic 
organization: the worker received less than the 
value of his marginal product, and thus he had 
insufficient incentives to exert effort. The ques- 
tion was. how could such a seemingly inefficient 
form of economic organization have survived for 
so long (and why should it be such a prevalent 
form of economic organization at so many 
different places at different times?). For those 
who believe in even a modicum of economic 
rationality, some explanation had to be found. 
One explanation that comes to mind is that 
peasants are more risk averse than landlords; if 
workers rented the land from the landlords, they 
would have to bear all of the risk. Though 
workers’ risk aversion is undoubtedly of import- 
ance, it cannot be the entire explanation: there 
are alternative (and perhaps more effective) 
risk-sharing arrangements. In particular, in the 
wage system, the landlord bears all of the risk, 
the worker none. Any degree of risk sharing 
between the landlord and the worker can be 
attained by the worker dividing his time between 
working as a wage-laborer and working on his 
own or rented land.’ 
The other central part of the explanation of 
sharecropping is that it provides an effective 
incentive system in the presence of costly 
supervision. Since in a wage system, the worker’s 
compensation is not directly related to his out- 
put, the landlord must spend resources to ensure 
that the worker actually works. In a sharecropp- 
ing system, since the worker’s pay depends 
directly on his output, he has some incentives to 
work. The incentives may not be as strong as they 
would if he owned the land (since he receives, 
say, only half the product); but that is not the 
relevant alternative. Sharecropping thus repre- 
sents a compromise between the rental system. in 
which incentives are “correct” but all the risk is 
borne by the worker, and the wage system. in 
which the landlord who is in a better position to 
bear risk, bears all the risk but in which effort can 
only be sustained through expenditures on 
supervision. This new view (Stiglitz, 1974) turns 
the traditional criticism of sharecropping on its 
head: it is precisely because of its incentive 
properties, relative to the relevant alternative. 
the wage system, that the sharecropping system is 
employed. 
The contention that the rental system provides 
correct incentives is, however, not quite correct. 
The rental system provides correct incentives for 
effort decisions. But tenants make many deci- 
sions other than those involving effort; they 
make decisions concerning the choice of tech- 
nique, the use of fertilizer, the timing of harvest, 
etc. These decisions affect the riskiness of the 
outcomes. For instance, many of the high- 
yielding seed varieties have a higher mean 
output, but a greater sensitivity to rainfall. 
Whenever there is a finite probability of default 
(that is, the tenant not paying the promised rent). 
then tenants may not have, with the rental 
system, the correct incentives with respect to 
these decisions. Of course, with unlimited liabil- 
ity. the worker could be made to bear all of the 
costs. But since the tenant might be unable to pay 
his rent even if he had undertaken all of the 
“right” decisions, and since it is often difficult to 
ascertain whether the individual took “unnecess- 
ary” risks, most societies are reluctant to grant 
unlimited liability, or to use extreme measures 
like debtor prisons, to ensure that individuals do 
not take unnecessarv risks.’ Hence, in effect, 
part of the costs of risk taking by the tenant is 
borne by the landlord.J With sharecropping, 
both the landlord and the tenant face the same 
risks.’ 
Thus, sharecropping can be viewed as an 
institution which has developed in response to (a) 
risk aversion on the part of workers; (b) the 
limited ability (or desire) to force the tenant to 
pay back rents when he is clearly unable to do so; 
and (c) the limited ability to monitor the actions 
of the tenant (or the high costs of doing so). 
The general theory has been extended in a 
number of directions, only three of which I can 
discuss here: cost sharing, interlinkage, and 
technical change. 
In many situations, there are other important 
inputs besides labor and land, such as bullocks 
or fertilizer. How should these inputs be paid 
for? Clearly, if the worker pays all of the costs, 
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but receives only a fraction of the benefits, he 
will have an insufficient incentive to supply these 
other inputs. Cost sharing is a proposed remedy. 
If the worker receives 50% of the output, and 
pays 50% of the cost, it would appear that he has 
the correct incentives: both benefits and costs 
have been cut in half.6 
But in fact, though cost shares equal to output 
shares are common, they are far from universal. 
How do we explain these deviations from what 
seems both a simple, reasonable rule, and a rule 
which ensures economic efficiency? To find the 
answer, we again return to our general theoreti- 
cal framework, which focuses on the role of 
imperfect information. First, it is clear that the 
landlord may want the tenant to supply more 
fertilizer than he would with a 50-50 rule, if 
increasing the fertilizer increases the marginal 
product of labor, and thus induces the worker to 
work harder. Remember, the central problem of 
the landlord is that he cannot directly control the 
actions of his worker; he must induce them to 
work hard. The reason that sharecropping was 
employed was to provide these additional incen- 
tives . 
But if a cost-sharing arrangement can be 
implemented, it means that the expenditures can 
be monitored; and if the expenditures can be 
monitored, there is no necessity for engaging in 
cost sharing; rather the terms of the contract 
could simply specify the levels of various inputs. 
But workers typically have more information 
about current circumstances than the landlord (in 
the fashionable technical jargon, we say there is 
an asymmetry of information). A contract which 
specifies the level of inputs cannot adapt to the 
changing circumstances. Cost-sharing contracts 
provtde the ability and incentives for these 
adaptations, and thus are more efficient contracts 
than contracts which simply specified the level of 
inputs.’ 
Another aspect of economic organization in 
many LDCs is the interlinkage of markets: the 
landlord may also supply credit (and he may also 
supply food and inputs as well). How can we 
explain this interlinkage? Some have claimed 
that it is simply another way that landlords 
exploit their workers. We shall comment later on 
these alternative explanations. For now, we 
simply note that our general theory can explain 
the prevalence of interlinkage (both under 
competitive and noncompetitive circumstances). 
We have repeatedly noted the problem of the 
landlord in inducing the worker both to work 
hard and to make the “correct” decisions from 
his point of view (with respect to choice of 
technique, etc.) Exactly analogous problems 
arise with respect to lenders. Their concern is 
that the borrower will default on the loan. The 
probability of a default depends in part on the 
actions taken by the borrower. The actions of the 
tenant-borrower thus affect both the lender and 
the landlord. Note too that the terms of the 
contract with the landlord will affect the lender, 
and vice versa: if the landlord can, for instance 
reduce the probability of default by supplying 
more fertilizer, the lender is better off. The 
actions of the borrower (both with respect to 
effort and the choice of technique) may be 
effected by the individual’s indebtedness, so that 
the landlords (expected) income may be affected 
by the amount (and terms) of indebtedness. 
There appear to be clear and possibly significant 
externalities betwen the actions of the landlord 
and the actions of the lender. Whenever there 
are such externalities, a natural market solution 
is to internalize the externality, and that is 
precisely what the interlinkage of markets does.’ 
Thus, interhnkage is motivated by the desire 
for economic efficiency, not necessarily by the 
desire for further exploitation of the worker. 
Interlinkage has, in turn, been linked to the 
incentives landlords have for resisting profitable 
innovations. Bhaduri” has argued, for instance, 
that landlords-cum-creditors may resist innova- 
tions, because innovations reduce the demand 
for credit, and thus the income which they 
receive in their capacity as creditors. Braverman 
and Stiglitz”’ have shown that there is no 
presumption that innovations result in a reduc- 
tion in the demand for credit. Credit is used to 
smooth income across periods, and under quite 
plausible conditions, innovations may either in- 
crease or decrease the aggregate demand for 
credit. But they argue further that what happens 
to the demand for credit is beside the point. 
The central question is simply whether the 
innovation moves the economically relevant utih- 
ties possibilities schedule outward or inward. The 
utilities possibilities schedule gives the maximum 
level of (expected) utility to one group (the 
landlord) given the level of (expected) utility of 
the other (the workers). The economically rele- 
vant utilities possibilities curve takes into account 
the information problems which have been the 
center of our discussion thus far, for instance, the 
fact that with sharecropping, individuals’ incen- 
tives are different from what they would be with 
costless monitoring. The utilities possibilities 
schedule with costless monitoring might move 
one way, the economically relevant utilities 
possibilities schedule the other. Thus, for inst- 
ance, there are innovations which. at each level 
of input, increase the output, but which, at the 
same time, exacerbate the incentives-monitoring 
problem. Such innovations would not be socially 
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desirable. Landlords would resist such innova- 
tions, as well they should, though from an 
“engineering” point of view, such innovations 
might look desirable. 
The consequences of interlinkage for the 
adoption of innovations, within this perspective, 
are ambiguous. There are innovations which 
would be adopted with interlinkage, but would 
not without it, and conversely; but the effect of 
the innovation on the demand for credit does not 
seem to play a central role. 
Though the landlord correctly worries about 
the incentive-monitoring consequences of an 
innovation, one should not jump to the conclu- 
sions either that the landlords collectively make 
decisions which maximize their own welfare. or 
that the landlord always makes the socially 
efficient decision. The landlord, within a 
competitive environment, will adopt an innova- 
tion if at current prices (terms of contracts, etc.) 
it is profitable for him to do so. Of course, when 
all the landlords adopt the innovation, prices 
(terms of contracts) will change, and they may 
change in such a way that landlords are adversely 
affected. ” In a competitive environment land- 
lords cannot resist innovations simply because it 
is disadvantageous to them to do so. (By 
contrast. if they are in a “monopoly” position. 
they will not wish to resist such innovations, since 
presumably they will be able to capture all the 
surplus associated with the innovation.) 
But just as the market allocation is not 
constrained Pareto efficient (even assuming a 
perfectly competitive economy) whenever there 
are problems of moral hazard, so too the market 
decisions concerning innovation are not con- 
strained Pareto efficient. (We use the term 
constrained Pareto efficient to remind us that we 
are accounting for the limitations on information; 
we have not assumed the government has any 
information other than that possessed by private 
individuals.) Though in principle there exist 
government interventions which (accounting for 
the costs of information) could make everyone 
better off, whether such Pareto improving in- 
terventions are likely to emerge from the political 
process remains a moot question. 
3. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
In this section, I wish to present in summary 
form what I view to be the major competing 
approaches to understanding the organization of 
economic activity in the rural sector. 
In many respects. I see my view as lying 
between other more extreme views. In one. the 
peasant is viewed as rational, working in an 
environment with reasonably complete informa- 
tion and complete and competitive markets. In 
this view, then, the differences between LDCs 
and more developed countries lies not so much in 
the difference between sophisticated. maximizing 
farmers and uneducated rule-bound peasants, as 
it does in differences in the economic environ- 
ments, the goods produced by these economies, 
their endowments. and how their endowments 
are used to produce goods. In this view, 
sharecropping is a rational response to the 
problems of risk sharing; but there is less concern 
about the incentive problems than I have ex- 
pressed; with perfect information and perfect 
enforceability of contracts, the sharecropping 
contract can enforce the desired level of labor 
supply and the choice of technique which is 
efficient. These theories have had little to say 
about some of the other phenomena which I have 
discussed: interlinkage, technical change, cost 
sharing. Interlinkage might be explained in terms 
of the advantages in transactions costs, but if 
transactions costs were central, one should only 
have observed simple cost-sharing rules (with 
cost share equalling output share). 
By contrast, there are those who view the 
peasant as irrational. with his behavior dictated 
by customs and institutions which may have 
served a useful function at some previous time 
but no longer do so. This approach (which I shall 
refer to, somewhat loosely, as the institutional- 
historical approach) may attempt to describe the 
kinds of LDCs in which there is sharecropping. 
interlinkage, or cost sharing. It may attempt to 
relate current practices to earlier practices. In 
particular, the institutional-historical approach 
may identify particular historical events which 
lead to the establishment of the sharecropping 
system, or to the development of the credit 
system. But this leaves largely unanswered the 
question of why so many LDCs developed similar 
institutional structures. or why in some countries 
cost shares equal output shares, while in others 
the two differ. More fundamentally, a theory 
must explain how carlier practices developed; 
and to provide an explanation of these, one has 
to have recourse to one of the other theories. 
Thus, by itself, the institutional-historical 
approach is incomplete. 
Still a third view emphasizes the departures 
from competitiveness in the rural sector. and the 
consequent ability of the landlords to exploit the 
workers. In some cases. workers are tied to their 
land; legal constraints may put the landlord in a 
position to exploit the worker. But in the absence 
of these legal constraints, one has to explain how 
the landlords exercise their allegedly coercive 
powers. In many LDCs there is a well-developed 
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labor market. Many landlords need laborers at 
harvest time and at planting time. The worker 
chooses for whom he will work. It is important 
to recognize that the exploitation hypothesis fails 
to explain the mechanisms by which, in situations 
where there are many landlords, they exercise 
their exploitative power.13 More generally, it 
fails to explain variations in the degree of 
exploitation over time and across countries. The 
fact that wages are low is not necessarily evidence 
of exploitation: the competitive market will yield 
low wages when the value of the marginal 
product of labor is low. 
The exploitation hypothesis also fails to ex- 
plain the detailed structure of rural organization: 
why cost shares are the way they are, or why (or 
how) landlords who can exploit their workers use 
the credit market to gain further exploitative 
capacity. 
There may be some grain of truth in all these 
approaches. Important instances of currently 
dysfunctional insitutions and customs can clearly 
be identified. Institutional structures clearly do 
not adapt instantaneously to changed circum- 
stances. Yet, as social scientists, our objective is 
to identify the systematical components, the reg- 
ularities of social behavior, to look for general 
principles underlying a variety of phenomena. It 
is useful to describe the institutions found in the 
rural sector of LDCs, but description is not 
enough. 
Therefore, I view the rationality hypothesis as 
a convenient starting point, a simple and general 
principle with which to understand economic 
behavior. Important instances of departures from 
rationality may well be observed. As social 
scientists, our objectives is to look for systematic 
departures. Some systematic departures have 
been noted. for instance in the work of Tversky, 
in individuals’ judgments of probabilities, par- 
ticularly of small probability events; but as 
Binswanger’s 1978 study has noted, departures 
from the theory appear less important in “impor- 
tant” decisions than in less important decisions. 
Many of the seeming departures from “rational- 
ity” that have been noted can be interpreted as 
“rational” decision-making in the presence of 
imperfect information. 
I also view the competitiveness hypothesis as a 
convenient starting point.” Many of the central 
phenomena of interest can be explained without 
recourse to the exploitation hypothesis. Some 
degree of imperfect competition is not inconsist- 
ent with the imperfect information paradigm: the 
imperfect information paradigm provides part of 
the explanation for the absence of perfect 
competition; it can help identify situations where 
the landlords may be in a better position to 
exploit the workers. Moreover, to the extent that 
imperfect information limits the extent to which 
even a monopoly landlord can extract surplus 
from his workers, the imperfect information 
paradigm can provide insights into how he 
can increase his monopoly profits. The theory 
of interlinkage we have developed can thus 
be applied to the behavior of a monopolist land- 
lord. 
There is one other approach that has received 
some attention that is, in fact, closely related to 
the one I have advocated: the transactions cost 
approach, which attempts to explicate economic 
relations by focusing on transactions costs. 
Information costs are an important part of 
transactions costs (though information problems 
arise in other contexts as well). My reservations 
concerning the transactions cost approach lie in 
its lack of specificity: while the information 
paradigm provides a well-defined structure which 
allows one to derive clear propositions concern- 
ing, for instance, the design of contracts, the 
transactions cost paradigm does not. Thus, the 
transactions cost approach might provide some 
insight into why cost sharing is employed, but not 
into the terms of the cost-sharing agreement. The 
transactions cost paradigm might say that econo- 
mies of scope provide an explanation for why the 
landlord also supplies credit, but it does not 
provide insights into when the landlord-cum- 
creditor would subsidize credit, or when he 
would “tax” it. Moreover, while the information 
paradigm identifies parameters which affect the 
magnitude of the externalities between landlords 
and creditors, and thus enables, in principle, the 
identification of circumstances under which 
interlinkage is more likely to be observed; the 
transactions cost paradigm can do little more 
than to say that there are circumstances in which 
the diseconomies of scope exceed the economies, 
and in these circumstances there will not be 
interlinkage. 
4. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES 
In the previous section, I discussed briefly 
some of the major competing hypotheses. In this 
section, I wish to outline a set of criteria for 
evaluating a theory, and to apply these criteria to 
these alternative theories. No novelty is claimed 
for the criteria; no attempt is made to provide a 
general epistemological theory. ” These are pre- 
sented more in the spirit of a “working man’s” 
criteria. 
We can divide the criteria into two groups: 
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internal and external. The internal criteria 
include: ” 
(a) Internal consistency: Are the axioms 
(underlying assumptions) mutually consistent, 
and do the conclusions follow from these 
assumptions? 
(b) Simplicity: In general, the fewer the 
assumptions required to explain the given 
phenomena, the better. 
(c) Completeness: The assumptions of the 
model should be as “primitive” as possible. 
Thus, in macroeconomics, a theory which 
explains unemployment in terms of wage 
rigidities is, in this sense, incomplete: it leaves 
open the question of why wages are rigid. 
The external criteria include: 
(a) Verifiability (or falsifiability): The theory 
should have at least some implications which 
are verifiable or falsifiable, in principle; that 
is, it should at least be possible to design 
thought experiments under which some of the 
implications of the theory could be rejected. 
(b) External consistency: Are all the implica- 
tions of the model consistent with observa- 
tions? Note that among the (obvious and 
direct) implications of the model are those 
that directly follow from the assumptions; 
thus, if an assumption itself can be falsified, 
the model will not possess the property of 
external consistency. Friedman’s contention 
that a theory should only be judged by the 
validity of its conclusions is. in this view, 
wrong. Theories whose assumptions seem 
unreasonable, i.e., whose assumptions them- 
selves can be falsified or whose assumptions 
have other implications which seem unaccept- 
able (i.e.. can be falsified) should be rejected. 
Sonze of the implications of many “bad” 
theories may be correct; indeed, probably no 
theory that has received any attention has a/l 
of its implications inconsistent with (at least 
some interpretations of) the data. But a good 
theory should have no implication which is 
inconsistent with observations. 
(c) External completeness: The theory should 
have something to say about as many regular- 
ities that have been observed in the area of 
study as possible. Thus, a theory which 
explains both why there is sharecropping as 
well as the determinants of the shares is better 
than a theory which simply explains why there 
is sharecropping. This is closely related to the 
criteria of: 
(d) Specificity: A good theory should make as 
many specific predictions concerning particu- 
lar phenomena as possible. 
(e) Predictive power: A good theory should 
not only be consistent with regularities which 
have already been noted, but should suggest 
new regularities which have not yet been 
noted. 
(f) Generality: The same general hypotheses 
should be able to explain phenomena in 
widely different contexts. 
I now want to review the performance of the 
alternative theories in terms of these basic 
criteria. The imperfect information paradigm 
does well, I would argue. on all of the criteria. 
The work in this area has been marked by an 
attempt to state clearly the assumptions, and to 
derive its conclusions from the assumptions: it 
does well on the criterion of internal consistency. 
Similarly, it does well on the other two internal 
criteria: the assumptions are simple and are 
reasonably primitive. Though in most work, the 
information technology is taken as given, in some 
ongoing research (see e.g., Braverman-Stiglitz, 
forthcoming), even this is taken to be endoge- 
nously determined. The theory provides specific 
predictions which are verifiable, and indeed has 
something to say about virtually every aspect of 
rural economic organization. It makes predic- 
tions concerning a variety of regularities that 
should be found in LDCs, but unfortunately. 
these have not been subjected to rigorous testing. 
At the same time, there is no well-agreed upon 
regularity that seems inconsistent with the 
theory. 
One of its most attractive properties, however, 
is that the information paradigm provides a 
general framework which is applicable to both 
developed and less developed economies. The 
concerns about effort and choice of technique 
which are central to sharecropping reappear, in 
somewhat modified form, in the analysis of labor 
and capital markets in more developed countries. 
It shares this property with the “rational peasant, 
with perfect markets and complete information” 
paradigm. But the latter theory fails to provide a 
good account of the differences between devel- 
oped and less developed economies. 
But my major objection to the rational peasant 
model with full information and complete mar- 
kets (as with the corresponding theories of 
developed economies) is that it is inconsistent 
with many observations and it fails to provide 
explanations of others. 
It does not explain why sharecropping is 
employed (with perfect information, there are a 
variety of equivalent contractual forms; if 
sharecropping were employed, the contract 
would specify the amount of labor to be sup- 
plied). 
It fails to explain cost sharing, and in particu- 
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lar why cost shares should differ from output 
shares. 
It assumes that there is a complete set of risk 
markets; it is clear that individuals cannot pur- 
chase insurance against many important risks and 
that this has important consequences for their 
behavior. 
In most small villages, it is not reasonable to 
assume that if a landlord offered a rupee less to 
his wage laborers, he would obtain no workers. 
In many situations, there appear to be workers 
who are willing to work at the going wage, but 
fail to obtain employment: there appears to be 
involuntary unemployment, a phenomenon 
which seems inconsistent with the classical 
competitive models. 
This theory can be adapted to make it at least 
seem to explain the phenomena under study 
and to make it seem less inconsistent with the 
facts: ~ indeed, our imperfect information para- 
digm can be thought of as one such adaptation. 
But we would argue that it is a fundamental 
alteration, one which effects our views of econo- 
mic relations under a wide variety of circum- 
stances. When a theory provides predictions 
which are inconsistent with the facts in a wide 
variety of circumstances, and when it fails to 
provide explanations of important regularities, 
what is needed is not an ad hoc modification of 
the model on a case-by-case basis, but rather a 
basic reformulation: the imperfect information 
paradigm provides such a reformulation. 
The transactions cost approach represents 
another attempt o modify the basic theory in a 
consistent way. As we have commented above, 
information costs are a particular form of 
transaction costs, and I find many aspects of the 
transactions cost approach attractiveJ 7 But the 
theory fails on several of the critical external 
criteria: to the extent that the theory relies on 
unobservable transaction costs, it often seems to 
fail the test of falsifiability; just as the present set 
of economic relations is justified by current 
(unobservable) transaction costs, changes in the 
nature of economic relations are "explained" by 
reference to similarly unobservable changes in 
transaction costs. The theory also fails the test of 
specificity of predictions and of external 
completeness: as we noted, while it may provide 
an explanation for why sharecropping is em- 
ployed, it cannot explain the nature of the 
cost-sharing arrangements and has little to say 
about other terms of the sharecropping contract. 
By contrast, the exploitation theory fails on 
both the internal and external criteria for judging 
theories. There is not a clearly stated set of 
primitive assumptions from which the conclu- 
sions logically follow. For instance, if the struc- 
ture of economic relations is determined by the 
attempt of landlords to exploit their workers, 
what determines the limits on their capacities to 
do so? The theory fails to explain why 
sharecropping provides a better method of 
exploitation than other forms of contractual 
arrangements; it fails to explain why cost sharing 
enhances the ability of the landlord to exploit his 
workers. It fails to explain the circumstances 
under which cost shares would exceed output 
shares. And it fails to explain why providing 
credit enhances the ability of the landlord to 
exploit the peasant. When there are many 
landlords in a community, it fails to explain how 
they can act collusively together. The experience 
with cartels in other areas is that it is hard to 
maintain collusive arrangements voluntarily 
when the number of participants becomes more 
than a few. If this is true here, then the theory 
only provides an explanation of the structure of 
economic relations within communities with a 
limited number of landlords; if this is not true in 
LDCs, why? 
To the extent that the theory relies on the 
notion of power which cannot be independently 
quantified, the theory is not falsifiable: one can 
always account for differences in the terms of the 
contract over time or ~eographically in terms of 
differences in power.L~ To the extent that the 
theory fails to provide answers to these 
questions, it is seriously incomplete. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The theory of rural organization which is based 
on rational peasants in environments in which 
information is imperfect and costly provides a 
simple explanation for a wide variety of 
phenomena in LDCs. It represents an impor- 
tant application of a more general paradigm, 
what ! have referred loosely to as the 
"Imperfect Information Paradigm" which has 
been useful in explaining phenomena under a 
wide variety of settings, under competition, 
oligopoly, and monopoly, in labor markets, 
capital markets, insurance markets, and product 
markets. The richness of social phenomena is
such as to make it unreasonable to expect any 
theory to explain all of the observed variations in 
institutions and behavior. But a theory should at 
least be able to explain the important regular- 
ities. Here, we are concerned with explaining 
sharecropping, both its widespread use, and the 
form it takes; it should explain cost sharing, with 
cost shares frequently differing from output 
shares, and the interlinkage of credit and land 
markets. This our theory does, and the compet- 
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ing theories fail to do. There is a rich set of these tests are performed, the theory will still 
further predictions emanating from our theory stand, or whether it will have to be modified, or 
which have yet to be tested. Whether, when abandoned, remains to be seen. 
NOTES 
1. For two surveys of certain aspects of this work, 
see Stiglitz (1982b, 198.5). 
2. See Stiglitz (1974). 
3. Indeed, such extreme measures may have delete- 
rious incentive effects. discouraging risk taking. 
4. See Johnson (1950); Allen (1985). 
5. This aspect of sharecropping has been emphasized 
by Johnson (1950). and by Braverman and Stiglitz 
(1982a). See also Stiglitz and Weiss (19X1). 
6. See Heady (1947). 
7. See Braverman and Stiglitz (19X2b). 
X. See Braverman and Stiglitz (1982a). This problem 
is discussed in the more general information theoretic 
literature under the rubric of the multiple principle- 
agent problem. The externalities which WC have discus- 
sed here arise in virtually all moral hazard problems. 
See Arnott and Stiglitz (1984). 
Y. See Bhaduri (1973). 
10. Braverman and Stiglitz (forthcommg). 
11. If the innovation. at the current prices. increases 
the demand for workers enough, then the terms of the 
contracts may shift sufficiently in workers’ favor to 
make landlords worse off. This-is analogous to what. in 
more simple contexts. is referred to as a Pigou 
land-saving innovation. 
12. Note that recent advances in repeated games have 
shown how collusive oufcomcs can he attained even in 
non-cooperative settings. Thus. landlords in rural 
economies where mobility is limited and in which there 
arc only a few landlords in any community may well act 
collusively. The circumstances in which thcsc non- 
cooperative collusive arrangements work well has. 
however. not been well studied. 
13. Indeed, with limited labor mobility. in small 
villages the labor markets are unlikely to be perfectly 
competitive; at the same time, the landlord is far from a 
labor monopolist. The real world is probably better 
described by a model of “monopolistic competition” 
than either of the polar models, monopoly or perfect 
competition. 
14. Similarly. this is not the place to provide an 
evaluation of alternative theories (e.g., the theories of 
Karl Popper). 
15. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. An 
important criterion in other contexts is rohusfrzess: the 
conclusions of the theory should not be sensitive to 
small perturbations in the assumptions. 
16. When the theory gets complicated by these ad hoc 
modifications it loses the property of simplicity. which 
was originally one of its main virtues. 
17. It is sometimes suggested that, once transactions 
costs are accounted for, equilibrium with rational 
peasants will have all the standard efficiency properties 
that economies with no transactions costs have. This is 
another example where the conclusion does not follow 
logically from the assumptions; the conclusion is 
arrived at by reasoning by analogy. Transactions costs 
(including information costs) are “like” other produc- 
tion costs. Why. once these are appropriately 
accounted for, should not the economy still be effi- 
cient? 
Unfortunately. it turns out that, in general, ccono- 
mies with imperfect information (or incomplete mar- 
kets) are not constrained Pareto efficient (whcrc the 
term “constrained” Pareto efficient simply reminds us 
that we have appropriately taken into account the 
transaction5 costs (information imperfection. incom- 
plete markets). (See Grcenwald and Stiglitz. forth- 
coming.) The formalization of Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand conjecture is one of the great achievements of 
modern economic theory; the Fundamental theorem of 
economics. like any other theorem. depends on the 
assumptions. The assumptions concerning perfect 
information. no transactions costs, and complete 
market markets are not innocuous assumptions. hut arc 
central to the validity of the result. Information costs 
may. in some respects. be like other costs of produc- 
tion. but the differences arc sufficiently important to 
invalidate the Fundamental Theorem of Wclfarc 
Economics. 
1X. Thus, “power” is to the exploitation theory what 
transactions cost is to the transactions cost model. 
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